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An overview of ideas and principles on equity valuation that emerge from Warren
Buffet s letters to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

Thesis Chairman: Dr. Bruce N iendorf

’/

Warren Buffett’s approach to equity valuation has developed from a straight
quantitative approach, which was influenced by the late Dr, Benjamin Graham to an
approach that relies on more qualitative analysis. This shift to the qualitative side was due
to the writings o f Philip Fisher and Buffett’s co-chairman o f Berkshire Charles Munger,
Buffett studied under Graham at Columbia where he developed an extraordinary grasp
o f financial quantitative analysis as defined in the classic text Security Analysis. Buffett’s
writings demonstrate his reliance upon two quantitative tools, which are the concept of
intrinsic value as developed by Graham and Dodd, and return on owner’s equity,
Buffett’s inclusion o f qualitative factors in equity valuation represents a shift away from
the Graham and Dodd value approach. An analysis of Buffett’s writings reveals the
subject making a distinction between a mere business and what he calls a “franchises” ,
Buffett maintains that a franchise possesses a very specific set o f economic
characteristics that separate them from mere businesses.
Furthermore, Buffett’s letters to the shareholders o f Berkshire Hathaway demonstrate a
clear set o f corporate governance principles that provide a deeper understanding and
explanation of the quantitative and qualitative tools employed by Berkshire management
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Chapter 1

An overview o f W arren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

To understand Warren Buffett one must understand the influence the late Dr.
Benjamin Graham o f Columbia University had upon Buffett. Buffett was drawn to
Columbia by the reputation o f Graham whom many consider to be the father of security
analysis. Graham is perhaps best known in academic circles for his classic text. Security
Analysis, which he co-authored with Dr. David Dodd who was also a noted lecturer at
Columbia. In many ways Graham gave Buffett the tools to make his way through the
vicissitudes and uncertainty of the engines of modern capitalism - the equity markets.
In the world o f finance and academia Graham was a far cry from the market
specialists who acted without logic and reason. “Graham was a classical scholar, a
student of Latin and Greek, a translator of Spanish poetry, and the author of a Broadway
play.” ' According to those that knew him he possessed an intellectual curiosity and
generosity that was unparalleled. In fact, a consistent theme that emerges throughout the
resource material this thesis is concerned with is best represented from this quote from
the Owner’s Manual, which is given to all Berkshire shareholders. Buffett states, “I
benefited enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest
teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned
from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as
Ben's teachings did for him.” Buffett has maintained this view throughout his career as he
has attempted to use the chairman’s letter of Berkshire’s annual report to educate
shareholders.
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Graham's contribution is the methodology that he brought to security analysis. He
argued that investors should look for securities that were so cheap to essentially be free of
risk.^ Graham equated this investment philosophy with searching for “cigar butts that
might have a few more puffs in them,” His approach placed an absolute emphasis on
quantitative factors such as earnings and assets. Furthermore Graham and Dodd
developed the concept of “intrinsic value”, which will be discussed later. In short,
Graham and Dodd argued that an investor needs to look at the business behind the stock
symbol and make rational, objective decisions based solely on a thorough analysis of a
firm’s financial statements. Graham was fond of saying “investment is most intelligent
when it is business like.”^
Buffett enrolled in Columbia’s business school during the fall of 1950 where he
quickly became a dedicated follower of Graham. Under Graham’s tutelage Buffett began
to hone his native gifts o f intellectual honesty, sound reasoning skills and patience. Upon
completing Graham’s course, Buffett was awarded the only A+ ever given by Graham."*
Perhaps the greatest gift Graham gave Buffett is the belief that one need not follow the
crowd. In fact, Graham often argued that by following the crowd one would surely
encounter the road to folly. Graham was fond of saying, “You are neither right nor wrong
because the crowd agrees or disagrees with you.”^ This view of the marketplace and the
quantitative tools Graham armed Buffett with coupled with Buffett’s temperament and
passion for investing set the stage for what many claim is the most extraordinary
investment career ever.
Upon graduating from Columbia in 1951 Buffett returned to Omaha to work in his
father’s brokerage firm. A short-time later he was offered a job by Graham to come back
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to New York and work directly for Graham as an analyst. After two years under the
venerable Graham, Buffett was ready to strike out on his own. He returned to his native
Omaha, Nebraska to start his own investment partnership, which was called Buffett
Associates Ltd This was the beginning o f Buffett’s long march to the annals o f
investment history.
While working for Graham in the 1950’s Buffett stumbled upon a Massachusetts
based textile firm called Berkshire Hathaway. Buffett was drawn to Berkshire because it
met all o f Graham’s quantitative criteria. In fact, by 1962 the company’s stock price had
fallen to below $8 although the company had $16.50 in working capital per share on the
books.^ This investment had Graham written all over it. By 1963 Buffett’s partnership
had become the largest holder o f common stock in the company and by May of 1965
Buffett was chairman o f the executive committee and was essentially in charge of
Berkshire.
Berkshire was at best a mediocre business and at worst a money losing pit that
required large infusions o f capital to stay afloat. Once Buffett took over, the evernecessary infusions were reduced drastically for Buffett allocated the profits to
enterprises that offered a higher return on capital Buffett began using Berkshire as an
acquisition vehicle that has grown into one o f the most watched companies in America.
Soon after taking over Berkshire he purchased National Indemnity Company, Sun
Newspapers of Omaha Inc , and Illinois National Bank & T ru st/ These acquisitions
couldn’t have been more different from the textile manufacturer that had become their
owner. However, they all had one thing in common - they met Buffett’s criteria for being
great businesses that offered excellent returns on equity.
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As Buffett’s investments through Berkshire began to blossom, the textile mills that
comprised the original business began to wane. For example, in 1970 the mills produced
$45,000 in profits while the insurance investments returned $2.1 million and the banking
investments returned $2.6 million.* Buffett was reluctant to close the mills because they
were large employers in the communities they were located in and he liked the
management. From 1977, to the mills closing in 1985, Buffett repeatedly attempted to
justify his position for keeping the mills open despite their drain on capital and the poor
return on equity that Buffett craved. The following explanation was offered to the
shareholders in the 1978 Chairman’s Letter. “We hope we don’t get into too many more
businesses with such tough economic characteristics, But, as we have stated before: (1)
our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2)
management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking
them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems,
and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” Another
factor that was never mentioned in the chairman’s letters was Buffett’s desire to avoid
being labeled a “liquidator”.
By July o f 1985 the textile operation was bleeding money and Buffett closed the mills.
The mills required repeated capital infusions, which Buffett was unwilling to provide In
his 1985 Chairman’s letter he summed up his view o f the textile business rather cleverly
“A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician
Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a
remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.” While the mills were
doomed the rest o f the Buffett portfolio was showing the world what a group of
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remarkable businesses could do. At the end of 1985 Buffett had given the shareholders of
Berkshire an annual gain o f 23.2% in per-share book value.
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Chapter 2

The Qualitative and Quantitative tools Employed by Buffett
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Qualitative
In Berkshire’s Owner’s Manual, Buffett states,

I set down 13 owner related

business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our
managerial approach. As is appropriate with “principles” they remain alive and well
today.” When one reads the chairman’s letters, it is clear that consistent themes emerge
from year to year with no variation and that Buffett’s desire to maintain the integrity of
the principles that built Berkshire has been maintained. This is particularly true of the
criteria that Buffett employs for equity valuation. The tools employed by Buffett have
been modified over the years from a strictly Graham based quantitative approach to one
that includes qualitative factors that look at the quality o f the intangible aspects of a
business. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the qualitative characteristics
Buffett looks for in businesses and then move into the quantitative tools that complete his
investment toolbox
Buffett’s move away from the strict quantitative approach can be attributed to two
men. The first is Phillip Fisher who was an original investment thinker and writer as well
as a fantastically successful investor. Fisher is quoted as saying, “I don’t want a lot of
good investments, I want a few outstanding ones

This approach is contrary to the

contemporary view in academia that supports portfolio diversification as opposed to
concentration. This “eggs in one basket approach” is repeatedly referred to in the
chairman’s letters and is consistent with Berkshire’s portfolio.
Through Fisher’s writings Buffett learned to place value on “scuttlebutt”. Fisher
argued that one o f the great tools the investor has available for selecting high-quality
equities is to talk with the company’s competitors, suppliers and customers. Fisher
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believed that a diligent investor could learn more through this method than through
rigorous financial statement analysis. Buffett employed this method during a corporate
scandal that brought American Express Corp’s stock price tumbling in the early 60’s.
Buffett believed that American Express possessed a consumer franchise that gave it an
extremely strong position in the marketplace. Buffett concluded that the company lacked
significant competition in the credit card market and the traveler’s checks the company
was known throughout the world for possessed a consumer monopoly. When the crisis hit
American Express, Buffett visited grocery stores and banks and talked to managers and
storeowners to see if the crisis had caused sales of traveler’s checks to drop off. He also
visited his favorite Omaha restaurant and sat behind the register to determine if fewer
customers were using their American Express credit cards aAer the scandal. Buffett
concluded that American Express was not losing sales because of the crisis and that
American Express was likely to weather the storm. Based on this information Buffett
increased his position in the company.
The American Express investment is of particular interest because it represents a
break from the quantitative Graham method to one that employs more of a qualitative
approach. Buffett was beginning to recognize that there are intangibles that couldn’t be
measured, which are crucial to differentiating a good business from a bad business. These
qualitative factors became an integral part of Buffett’s analysis.
Charles Munger, Berkshire’s co-chairman, has also contributed to Buffett’s inclusion
o f qualitative factors in investment analysis. Munger is an interesting figure and many
consider him to actually be the smarter of the two. After serving in World War II,
Munger so impressed the admissions committee at the Harvard Law School that he was
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admitted without an undergraduate degree. Munger shares Fisher’s view that qualitative
factors are extremely important and offer invaluable information in assessing a
company’s long-term economic viability. Consequently, since the beginning of their
formal partnership in 1976, Monger’s qualitative approach has been directly infused in
the investment process at Berkshire." This is not to say that quantitative measures have
been ignored. As Buffett stated, “ I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses
at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.”" This change caused Buffett to
look for what he called “franchises” as opposed to businesses.
In the 1991 chairman’s letter Buffett gave his shareholders a primer on the distinction
between a franchise, which he coveted, and an ordinary business which was doomed to
be average at best. Buffett defined a franchise as, “An economic franchise arises fi'om a
product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no
close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three
conditions will be demonstrated by a company’s ability to regularly price its product or
service aggressively and thereby earn high rates of return on capital.”" He also pointed
out that franchises can survive mismanagement because of their unique positions,
although the enterprises profitability will be diminished.
The economic characteristics o f a franchise contrast sharply with those of a business,
which Buffett basically defines as an enterprise that produces commodities. He argues
that a “business” can only succeed if it can be a low cost producer, which is an advantage
that is easily taken aw ay." Furthermore, he maintains that a “business unlike a franchise
can be killed by poor management .” The best example of purchasing a “business” in
Buffett’s investment career is the purchase of the textile mills that comprised the original
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Berkshire. He failed to consider non-qualitative factors in making his purchase decision
and it turned out to be one of the biggest money losers o f his career.
Buffett’s emphasis on qualitative factors can be seen in the purchases of Coca-Cola,
Gillette, GEICO, and See’s Candy, which is a chain o f candy stores located throughout
California. These companies were solid from a Graham perspective, but priced above
Graham’s “margin o f safety.” Buffett realized that it was better to purchase these
companies at a higher price because they possessed the characteristics o f a “franchise” as
opposed to a “business”

Quantitative
Throughout Buffett’s writings two major quantitative tools emerge as the foundation
of his analysis. The first is the concept o f “intrinsic value”, which Graham introduced
him to, and the second is return on equity. There is nothing extraordinary in these
concepts as they are relatively simple on the surface. However, the process of accurately
determining intrinsic value is far from easy.
Graham and Dodd began their discussion on the topic by saying, “Intrinsic value is the
investment concept on which our views o f security analysis are f o u n d e d . T h e r e is no
doubt that Buffett took this to heart. Every chairman’s letter written by Buffett has
references to intrinsic value. In the Berkshire Owner’s Manual, Buffett states, “Our long
term economic goal is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate o f gain in intrinsic
business value on a per-share basis.” Buffett defines intrinsic value as the discounted
value o f cash that can be taken out of a business over time. This concept is relatively
simple to understand although somewhat difficult to employ. Although, determining the
intrinsic value o f a company is a rough estimate, it still requires reasonably accurate
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forecasts o f earnings as well as the correct determination o f the rate at which the cash
flows should be discounted.
Once the intrinsic value o f a firm is roughly determined the analyst then waits for the
stock price to fall below this value. In Security Analysis, Graham and Dodd suggest that
the intrinsic or real value o f companies change slowly, while the market price of
securities sometimes fluctuates for no apparent reason other than irrational activities. This
approach is predicated on the belief that financial markets aren’t efficient, which is
contrary to the cornerstone o f modern investment philosophy - the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH states that stocks are always valued accurately and that it
is a waste o f time to try and beat the market. Theorists argue that the financial markets
and the analysts behind them are constantly evaluating companies and that all public
information is factored into the price o f the stock. Therefore, it is fruitless for an investor
to look for discrepancies in actual and market price because they don’t exist.
From 1977 to 1997 Buffett uses the chairman’s letter to rail against proponents of the
EMH. In the 1987 annual chairman’s letter Buffett stated, “In my opinion, the continuous
63-year arbitrage experience o f Graham-Newman Corp., Buffett Partnership, and
Berkshire illustrates just how foolish Efficient Market Theory is.” '^ Referring to the
theorists that support EMH Buffett went on to say, “Observing correctly that the market
was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient.
The difference between the two is night and day ” One astute author summed up the basic
argument behind Buffett’s vigorous attack on EMH by writing, “Buffett would taunt the
scholars with the evidence o f his career, and implicit in his taunts was a simple question:
“If you are so smart, how come I am so rich?” ’^
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In the 1977 chairman’s letter Buffett begins the discussion on corporate performance
by stating, “We believe a more appropriate measure o f managerial economic performance
to be return on equity capital.” Again this is a theme that emerges throughout the research
material. It is no surprise that Buffett emphasizes ROE as this is an owner oriented
financial ratio. Return on Equity is simply the return on the investment made by the
owners - the company’s shareholders. This tells Buffett how effectively a company’s
management is employing the equity capital that the shareholders have entrusted with
them. Buffett looks for companies with a long-term trend o f providing good returns on
equity while employing little or no debt. High returns on equity provide another bonus to
long-term investors, which is the compounding effect of the retained earnings as it is
assumed that the firm will continue to employ the owner’s capital at the historically
demonstrated levels.
There is nothing extraordinary about the quantitative and qualitative ideas that have
been introduced to the reader. However, these simple ideas are powerful concepts, which
a diligent student o f finance can employ. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the
development o f Buffett’s thinking over the years. In the early days Buffett was strictly a
quantitative investor. However, as the economic environment and his own thinking
developed he began to consider qualitative factors that are contrary to his earlier views
which were influenced by Benjamin Graham This development offers a glimpse of a
mind that was disciplined enough to follow strict formulaic investing, but flexible and
open enough to be influenced by new ideas. He seems to have found a middle ground that
incorporates a strong emphasis on quantitative factors, which are reconciled with
qualitative judgements that are made through good judgement and experience. Buffett has

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

reminded us o f one o f the great lessons in life, and that is the truth is often located
somewhere in the middle.
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In many ways Buffett’s Letters are a gift to students o f finance and management. To
simply focus on the principles o f finance is to ignore the larger part o f Buffett’s
contribution. Buffett’s commentary exposes the reader to larger societal issues such as
corporate citizenship, charities and inheritance issues as well as the equity markets role in
society. The letters also provide the student with a view o f an encompassing and well
reasoned philosophy that has been employed successfully.
Another byproduct o f the analysis o f the chairman’s letters is the candor and original
tone that he takes with his partners - the shareholders o f Berkshire Hathaway,
Throughout Buffett’s career he has read thousands o f annual reports and in many ways
felt dissatisfied with the way CEO ’s spoke to their shareholders. This dissatisfaction
drove Buffett to work hard to reach out to the shareholders and convey pertinent
information that was provided with the intention o f educating shareholders. Buffett’s
desire to share knowledge and ideas with the public was largely stimulated by his
experience with the late Benjamin Graham.
Graham introduced Buffett to the world of quantitative based equity analysis. It was
through a detailed study o f the classic text Security Analysis, and the countless hours
spent with Graham that Buffett came into his own. Graham’s intellectual generosity
provided the fertile soil in which an extraordinary mind was able to grow. While Graham
contributed more than any other person to Buffett’s intellectual development as an
investor he is not alone as others have made substantial contributions. Buffett began his
career as a strict Graham and Dodd value investor and slowly began to incorporate
qualitative factors into his investment philosophy. This was due largely to the writings of
Philip Fisher. Fisher argued that investors should talk with suppliers and competitors to
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obtain information about an investment’s prospect. Fisher maintained that this
information was invaluable in assessing investments. Charles Munger, co-chairman o f
Berkshire, has also contributed to Buffett’s propensity to increasingly balance
quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis. M onger’s role in Berkshire’s investments
is considerable to say the least, although, his role is understated to the public because of a
personal preference to avoid the spotlight. A similar project on Charles M unger would
certainly be worthwhile and could provide valuable insight into the ideas produced by a
great mind.
Perhaps the greatest lesson learned by studying the intellectual influences and ideas
behind Buffett is his ability to learn and remain open to new ideas. Buffett’s intellectual
development provides the student with a valuable lesson in the need to maintain
principles, but at the same tim e demonstrates the importance o f remaining open to new
ideas and methods.
However, it should be pointed out that Buffett has his detractors. Some in the
academic environment and the financial press have accused Buffett o f taking advantage
o f opportunities the ordinary investor clearly doesn’t have. M any o f these opportunities
stemmed from the hostile acquisitions o f the 1980’s. Buffett’s reputation as a long-term
investor was seen as a god send by CEOs under attack by a hostile bidder. Consequently,
CEOs under attack would offer Buffett enticing deals that were not available to the
public. Linda Sandler o f the Wall Street Journal wrote, “Many Wall Street investors say
Mr, B uffett’s special deals amount to a kind o f gentlemanly protection game. In the old
days, these investors say, corporate raiders such as Saul Steinberg got paid “greenmail”
to go away. But Mr. Buffett is getting “whitemail” to stick around and hold
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management’s hand

The criticism stems primarily from three investments Buffett

made in 1989, The investments were in US Air, Champion International and Gillette. In
all three cases, Buffett received a preferred convertible that was not available to the
public.'^ In the 1989 chairman’s letter Buffett argued that he was responsible for
securing the best deal for his shareholders and that the companies Berkshire took
positions in would benefit in the long term by the presence o f a stable long term
shareholder. What is clear is that Buffett’s actions seem to contradict his disdain for
special deals.
A discussion on Buffett’s ideas and Berkshire Hathaway would not be complete
without including the 13 principles that Buffett has publicly stated for over 20 years.
While most o f these principles are outside the scope o f the quantitative and qualitative
equity valuation methods this thesis is concerned with, they offer an important insight
into Buffett’s philosophy and view o f the candor and the ethics business leaders should
employ. The 13 principles are the focus of the Owner’s Manual, which is given to all
Berkshire shareholders. This Owner’s Manual is intended to provide shareholders with a
view o f the philosophy utilized at Berkshire and in so doing provides the reader with the
most encompassing and concise view o f world-class corporate governance available. The
13 principles are as follows,
1) Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership, Charlie Munger and I
think o f our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners
(Because o f the size o f our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling
partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner o f our business
assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own
the assets.
2) In line with Berkshire's owner-orientation, most o f our directors have a major portion
o f their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.
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3) Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to
maximize Berkshire's average annual rate o f gain in intrinsic business value on a pershare basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of
Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate
o f per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will
see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average
large American corporation.
4) Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of
businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital.
Our second choice is to own parts o f similar businesses, attained primarily through
purchases o f marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and
availability o f businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given
year's capital allocation.
5) Because o f our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the
limitations o f conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal
relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners
and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also
report to you the earnings o f each major business we control, numbers we consider of
great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about
the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgm ents about them.
6) Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation
decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of
earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to
purchase $1 o f earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces
us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for
double the pro-rata price o f small portions (whose earnings will be largely
unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be
fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
7) We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on
a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over
leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the
only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to
policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually
large portions o f their net worth to our care. (As one o f the Indianapolis "500"
winners said: "To finish first, you must first finish.")
8) A managerial "wish list" will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not
diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term
economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what
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we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying
your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
9) We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the
wisdom o f retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers
shareholders at least $1 o f market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has
been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth
grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
10) We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we
give. This rule applies to all forms o f issuance - not only mergers or public stock
offerings, but stock- for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well.
We will not sell small portions o f your company - and that is what the issuance of
shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent with the value o f the entire enterprise
11 ) You should be flilly aware o f one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial
performance: Regardless o f price, we have no interest at all in selling any good
businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses
as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good
about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation
mistakes that led us into such sub- par businesses. And we react with great caution to
suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by
major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates
sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is
about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial
behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We
would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of
behavior.
12) We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses
important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts
that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less.
Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be
inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness
when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when
reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who
misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
13) Despite our policy o f candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities
only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and
subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas
are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends
even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks
we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say "no
comment" on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
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In the Owner’s Manual Buffett provides a detailed discussion o f these 13 principles
that guide Berkshire However, it is not practical to include that discussion within the
confines o f this thesis. It is clear that an awareness of these principles reveals a deeper
understanding o f the methods that Buffett employs and demonstrates the interrelationship
between some o f the ideas that have been presented in these pages. One would be well
served by seeking to understand the implications and benefits o f the aforementioned
principles.
Throughout the research in this project a host of extraordinary minds, personalities,
ideas and relationships were encountered. However, the friendship between Buffett and
Graham stands out above them all. Therefore the author believes that it is fitting that
some o f the last words be theirs. When Graham died Buffett wrote a eulogy for the
Financial Analysts Journal and the final words in the eulogy spoke volumes o f both men.
Buffett wrote, “A man named Walter Lippman wrote of men who plant trees that other
men will sit under. Benjamin Graham was such a man.”
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